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The Orphan Drug Act: How the FDA Unlawfully
Usurped Market Exclusivity
By Sumin Kim*
The Board of KV Pharmaceutical bet the company on the success of Makena®, a preterm birth drug. However, in the midst of a public outcry over the excessive pricing of
Makena®, the FDA declared that it would not honor the market exclusivity that KV
Pharmaceutical had obtained for Makena® under the Orphan Drug Act. As a result, KV
Pharmaceutical filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This Note analyzes the situation under
the lens of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, I argue that market
exclusivity for Makena® was private property and thus, the FDA unlawfully usurped KV
Pharmaceutical’s private property without just compensation.
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

In 2011, KV Pharmaceutical (“KV”) drew the public ire for pricing Makena®, a
preterm birth drug, at roughly seventy-five times the price of the generic, shortly after
receiving seven years of market exclusivity under the Orphan Drug Act. 1 In addition to
the excessive price hike, which put the drug out of reach for many qualified patients,
people were enraged that KV had the gall to use a taxpayer-funded study to prove the
safety and effectiveness of Makena®, only to turn around and try to reap monopoly rents
from taxpayers.2 The Food and Drug Administration (the “FDA”) subsequently
announced that it would not regulate pharmacies that compounded the generic version of
Makena®, and it supported its stance by pointing out that KV relied on research funded
by the National Institutes of Health.3
At first glance, the situation seems like another iteration of a greedy drug company
trying to make windfall profits. Although KV did not act illegally, there is a gut sense
that its actions were wrong. Hence, it is very easy to agree with the FDA’s decision to
exercise enforcement discretion concerning Makena®. However, this Note takes the
opposite stance in arguing that the FDA was wrong to exercise its enforcement discretion.
The basis for the argument lies in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. By
refusing to enforce market exclusivity, the FDA effectively usurped property from KV
without just compensation. In support of the argument, this Note looks to the legislative,
executive, and judicial intent behind the Orphan Drug Act.
Section II describes the impetus behind the Orphan Drug Act and analyzes how
Congress has amended and the FDA has implemented the Act. The analysis in Section II
*

J.D., 2013, Northwestern University School of Law; B.S., 2006, University of California, Berkeley.
Andrew Zajac, Drug Maker Lowers Price of Makena Pregnancy Drug to $690 per Dose, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/01/news/la-pn-makena-price-cut-fda-20110401.
2
Id.
3
FDA Statement on Makena, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 8, 2011),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm279098.htm.
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reveals that the legislative and executive branches of government have been very
consistent in upholding and promoting the financial incentives, and particularly the
market exclusivity provision, of the Orphan Drug Act. Section III provides the
tumultuous history of Makena®, and in the process, shows that contrary to the public
discourse, Makena® is not fully accepted by the medical community as a safe and
effective drug for preterm birth. Since the FDA’s modus operandi is to protect the
public, this finding suggests that Makena® is exactly the type of drug that needs FDA
approval and oversight. Sections IV and V delve into the debate behind the FDA’s
decision to approve Makena®, and in doing so, further reveal the uncertainty surrounding
the drug’s safety. Like Section III, this uncertainty surrounding Makena® suggests that it
is exactly the type of drug that needs FDA oversight. Finally, Section VI advances the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause argument to reach the conclusion that the FDA was
wrong to exercise its enforcement discretion.
II. THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT
¶4

¶5

¶6

Today, an estimated ten to twenty million people in the United States suffer from
some type of a rare disease,4 which Congress has defined as a disease affecting 200,000
people or less.5 For pharmaceutical companies, the limited population size serves as a
financial disincentive for the development of drugs for rare diseases. This disincentive is
entirely understandable, since on average, it is estimated to cost more than $300 million
and ten years to bring a drug to market.6 With only 200,000 potential customers, a drug
company would have a difficult time simply recouping the cost of development.
The financial disincentives of developing drugs for rare diseases are so compelling
that even when a compound is already identified as a possible treatment, pharmaceutical
companies will not pursue it.7 To make matters worse, many potential treatments are not
patentable because the compounds are often discovered during the course of research on
different drugs, and their potential use in the treatment of rare diseases is discussed in
printed publications.8 When patent protection is unavailable, firms are even less willing
to invest in the development of a drug, because a copycat firm could then free-ride off the
investment and underprice the first firm.9 Consequently, many therapeutic compounds
are left without a sponsor to conduct the clinical trials necessary for FDA approval. In
the medical community, these drugs without sponsors have become known as
“orphans.”10
In the early 1980s, Congress began to take an interest in orphan drugs. In the
aggregate, rare diseases were affecting between ten and twenty million people in the

4

Gary A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act: What’s Right With It?, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 299, 305 (1999).
5
David D. Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of Innovation? At What Cost?, 55 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 125, 125 (2000).
6
Pulsinelli, supra note 4, at 304.
7
Rohde, supra note 5, at 126.
8
Id. at 127 (saying, in fn. 12, that printed publications are considered prior art and would preclude an
idea from being patented).
9
Pulsinelli, supra note 4, at 304.
10
Rohde, supra note 5, at 125.
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United States.11 As a result, by 1983 Congress passed and implemented the Orphan Drug
Act12 (the “Act”) in order to incentivize the development of drugs for rare diseases.
A. Legislative Intent
¶7

An analysis of the proposed and accepted amendments to the Act reveals that
Congress has, except on one occasion, advocated the use of financial incentives,
especially market exclusivity, to promote the development of orphan drugs. This
advocating of financial incentives has come even with the recognition that drug
companies could take advantage of the Act for excessive profits. Such an end is not
within the spirit of the Act, but is nevertheless legal. The analysis first focuses on market
exclusivity and then looks to other provisions of the Act in general.
1. Market Exclusivity

¶8

The cornerstone of the Act is the seven years of market exclusivity that an orphan
drug sponsor receives upon FDA approval for its drug.13 Market exclusivity can be
achieved because the FDA must approve all drugs that are marketed in the United
States.14 Thus, by refusing to approve a similar drug for seven years, the FDA can
effectively create a monopoly for an orphan drug.15
¶9
However, there are two exceptions to market exclusivity. The first is when a
sponsor cannot “assure the availability of sufficient quantities of the drug to meet the
needs of persons with the disease.”16 The second is when a sponsor agrees to share the
market with another firm.17 It seems significant that Congress specified only two
exceptions to market exclusivity, especially since Congress did not create any limitations
on the pricing of orphan drugs. A law that goes beyond patent protection and guarantees
a monopoly market is clearly a potential target for abuse. Yet, Congress did not include
any safety valves that would allow the FDA to limit market exclusivity in case a sponsor
was able to excessively profit off an orphan drug.18 To the contrary, numerous
amendments were proposed that aimed to limit the ability of drug companies to make
excessive profits. Yet, none of those amendments to market exclusivity were ever
passed.19
¶10
In 1990, Congress came very close to limiting market exclusivity, 20 but President
Bush pocket-vetoed the amendments. The President stated that he did not want to
11

Pulsinelli, supra note 4, at 305.
21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
13
Id. § 360cc.
14
See Jesse M. Boodoo, Compounding Problems and Compounding Confusion, 36 AM. J.L. & MED.
220, 231 (2010) (noting that all drugs are regulated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
15
The FDA could still approve the exact same drug for another indication. However, the monopoly
would be effective at least with regard to the application of the drug to the specific disease.
16
21 U.S.C. § 360cc(b)(1) (2006).
17
Id. § 360cc(b)(2).
18
The Act was not envisioned as a way for drug companies to make a lot of profit.
19
Pulsinelli, supra note 4, at 324-36.
20
See 136 CONG. REC. H5799 (daily ed. July 30, 1990). The amendment would have permitted
simultaneous licensing of the same orphan product for the same indication if (i) the second company
requests orphan designation within six months of publication by the FDA of its action to designate the drug
for the first company; (ii) the second company initiates human clinical trials not more than twelve months
12
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endanger the Act’s success, which he believed was driven primarily by the incentive of
market exclusivity.21 Representative Henry A. Waxman, who was responsible for
drafting the 1990 Amendments, tried again in 1994 to place limits on market
exclusivity.22 However, this time, Congress failed to act upon the proposed amendments,
reflecting a shift back towards favoring unfettered market exclusivity for orphan drugs. 23
2. Amendments
¶11

In the first version of the Act, Congress included two provisions that reflected a
desire to promote orphan drugs, but which were unsuccessful in doing so.24 First,
Congress gave the FDA the discretion to determine whether a disease was rare, or in
other words, to decide whether there was any reasonable expectation of recovering the
cost of development.25 Second, in order to qualify as an orphan drug, the drug had to be
unpatentable and unpatented.26 These two provisions were subsequently amended to
more effectively promote development of orphan drugs.
¶12
In 1984, Congress eliminated the “reasonable cost of development” provision and
redefined “orphan” to mean any drug that had a target population of 200,000 persons or
less.27 The amendment was in response to drug companies’ reluctance to sink money into
estimating cost, only to be rejected and have information about their operations
revealed.28 In 1985, Congress further reduced the requirements for obtaining orphan drug
status by eliminating the patent provisions.29 Again, the amendment was in response to
the lack of firm activity regarding orphan drugs.30 When the Act was first passed,
Congress believed that patent law would be sufficient to incentivize the development of
patentable and patented orphan drugs.31 While in reality, many potential orphan drugs
were under patents that either had expired or had very little patent time left, meaning
firms did not want to invest in the development of these drugs because they would have
no guarantee of recouping their investment.32 Furthermore, it was difficult to determine
after the first company initiated clinical trials; and (iii) the second company submits an approvable new
drug application to the FDA no more than one year after the first company submits its new drug
application.
21
Gerald Mossinghoff, President of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, stated that “by far
the most important incentive offered by the Orphan Drug Act” is market exclusivity. Waxman Bill Limits
Seven-Year Exclusivity Granted Orphan Drugs, BIOTECH. NEWSWATCH, May 7, 1990, at 4.
22
See H.R. 4865, 103d Cong. (1994), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS103hr4865rh/pdf/BILLS-103hr4865rh.pdf. See also Orphan Drugs, WAXMAN.HOUSE.GOV,
http://waxman.house.gov/orphan-drugs (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
23
Id.
24
See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§
360aa–360ee (1994)).
25
Pulsinelli, supra note 4, at 306.
26
Id. The FDA interpreted the patent requirements to mean that an orphan drug can receive approval
when (1) no use or product patent has been issued or (2) no use patent has been issued and the product
patent has expired. H.R. REP. NO. 99-153, at 3-4 (1985).
27
Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-551, 98 Stat. 2815
(1984).
28
See Pulsinelli, supra note 4, at 307.
29
See Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-91, 99 Stat. 387 (1985).
30
Pulsinelli, supra note 4, at 308.
31
H.R. REP. NO. 99-153, at 3 (1985).
32
Id. at 4. As discussed supra note 26, the FDA was willing to approve an orphan drug that had an
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whether a drug was patentable, making it time-consuming for an orphan drug to go
through the approval process.33 In 1988, Congress again amended the Act to require
firms to notify the FDA one year in advance of discontinuing the production of an orphan
drug, so that the FDA would have enough time to find another manufacturer.34
¶13
Two themes become apparent from the amendments to the Act. First, Congress
understood the need to provide certainty in the approval process for orphan drugs.
Naturally, if the FDA had sole discretion in determining the legitimacy of a forecasted
market for an orphan drug, potential sponsors would be deterred from sinking an
investment into pursuing that drug because of uncertainty. This deterrence especially
holds true for orphan drugs because they do not have high profitability potential to begin
with. Thus, by creating a bright line rule of 200,000 persons or less in order to qualify as
an orphan, and thereby creating an environment of regulatory certainty, Congress was
attempting to reduce the barriers to orphan drug development. The same initiative was
seen in the amendments to the patent provisions in 1985. By removing the patentability
requirement, Congress was creating a more predictable process for potential orphan drug
sponsors.
¶14
The second theme to emerge, and one that served as the impetus for the first, is that
Congress was determined to bring orphan drugs to market. Prior to the 1985
Amendments, the Committee on Energy and Commerce (the “Committee”), overseeing
the proposed amendments, was well aware that firms could profitably abuse the Act by
taking advantage of the seven years of market exclusivity.35 Thus, the Committee fully
understood that removing the patent provisions would only increase the potential for
abuse, since it would be easier to obtain orphan drug status. Despite this problem, the
Committee “decided that it would still recommend the amendment because it was viewed
as an important incentive for the development of orphan drugs.”36 Congress agreed and
the amendments were soon adopted. Over the next two years, the Committee monitored
the orphan drug situation and in December of 1987, recommended that amendments be
made to limit the market exclusivity provision of the Act. 37 However this time, Congress
did not agree. Instead, Congress reemphasized its resolve in bringing orphan drugs to
market when it passed the notification requirement. Effectively, Congress was signaling
to the drug industry that it wanted the public to have stable and continuous access to
orphan drugs, even at the risk of potential abuse.
¶15
In conclusion, it seems pretty clear that Congress was determined to bring orphan
drugs to market by providing certainty in the approval process. Moreover, the fact that
Congress was willing to create a bright line rule, even if the rule was overly inclusive (of
potentially profitable orphan drugs, i.e. drugs that do not need financial incentives),
suggests that Congress was willing to risk a few years of overpriced drugs in order to
save lives.38
expired product patent. This gave firms an incentive to wait until the patent expired, which further
prolonged the development of orphan drugs.
33
Pulsinelli, supra note 4, at 308.
34
Id. at 309; 21 C.F.R. § 316.23 (1999).
35
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-473, at 6 (1987).
36
Id.
37
Id. at 6–7.
38
See Pulsinelli, supra note 4, at 318 (“[T]he real tradeoff . . . is between having expensive drugs and
having no drugs for these diseases.”).
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3. Other Provisions
¶16

In addition to market exclusivity, the Act provides many other financial incentives
as well. First, orphan drug sponsors can request FDA assistance in navigating the
complex and costly approval process.39 Second, orphan drug sponsors can manufacture
their drug prior to receiving full FDA approval.40 Third, orphan drug sponsors receive a
tax credit for fifty percent of the amounts spent on clinical trials.41 And finally, sponsors
are eligible for federal grants to help defray the costs of clinical testing. 42 All of these
financial incentives clearly indicate that Congress has been determined to promote the
development of orphan drugs.
¶17
Along those same lines, Congress has also indicated its desire to promote orphan
drugs by the amendments that it did not pass. For example, an amendment was proposed
in 1990 that would tax any revenue from orphan drugs once a firm was able to recapture
twice the drug’s development costs plus twenty-five percent of annual profit.43 The
legislation was an attempt to curb the profit making potential of orphan drugs. In 1991,
the 1990 Amendment was modified and re-proposed, calling for a seventy-five percent
tax on all profits once development costs had been recovered. 44 Again the proposal did
not find support within Congress. In 1993, the amendment was again modified and
rejected, this time calling for a seventy-five percent tax on all profits in excess of 125
percent of production costs, but only after all development costs had been recovered. 45
The failure of these proposals to make their way into legislation indicates that Congress
has not been afraid to use financial incentives to promote the development of orphan
drugs.
B. FDA Intent
¶18

In January 1993, almost ten years after the Act was implemented, the FDA finally
passed regulations for administering the Act.46 In the Orphan Drug Regulations (the
“Regulations”), the FDA formally laid out the rules by which it was administering the
Act and also addressed various concerns that came from both the drug industry and
associations representing patients with rare diseases.47 The FDA’s responses to those
concerns revealed that it was fully aligned with Congress’s preference for financial
incentives. Moreover, a careful look at the Regulations confirmed likewise.

39

See 21 U.S.C. § 360aa (1994) (the FDA will advise on what tests and experiments are required and
how to effectively design clinical trials).
40
See id. § 360dd.
41
See 26 U.S.C. § 45C (Supp. II 1994).
42
See 21 U.S.C. § 360ee. See also Pulsinelli, supra note 4, at 313 (indicating the costs were originally
limited to human testing, but later expanded in the 1988 Amendments to include all testing).
43
See 136 CONG. REC. H6194 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1990) (statement of Rep. Stark). See also Rohde,
supra note 5, at 137.
44
See 137 CONG. REC. E1171 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Stark reintroducing the Orphan
Drug Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1991). See also Pulsinelli, supra note 4, at 336.
45
See 139 CONG. REC. H1851 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1993) (remarks of Rep. Stark regarding amendments to
the Orphan Drug Windfall Profits Tax Act). See also Pulsinelli, supra note 4, at 336.
46
See Orphan Drug Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 62076 (Dec. 29, 1992) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
316).
47
Id.
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¶19

One concern was that improvements in diagnostics and screening technologies
would result in patient populations much greater than that initially anticipated for orphan
drugs.48 In other words, an orphan drug could potentially serve a patient population
greater than 200,000 people and become very profitable, but remain an orphan because
there was no way to revoke orphan status. However, the FDA said that it had no way of
determining the likely treatment population and thus, kept the bright line rule of 200,000
people as determined by current diagnostic methods.49
¶20
A similar concern suggested that market exclusivity be withdrawn if an orphan
drug later proved to have commercial potential or exceeded the 200,000-patient
threshold.50 But in response, the FDA deferred to President Bush’s pocket-veto in 1990
that otherwise would have authorized the FDA to revoke an approval for such reasons. 51
The FDA’s response to both this concern and the one above was codified in 21 C.F.R. §
316.29, which lists the conditions under which the FDA can revoke an orphan drug
designation. The three conditions are: (1) if the request for designation contained an
untrue statement of material fact, (2) if the request omitted material information, or (3) if
the drug in fact had not been eligible for orphan drug status at the time of submission of
the request.52 Prominently missing from this list is any condition regarding patient
population or profitability, reflecting a strong preference for incentives. Furthermore, 21
C.F.R. § 316.29(c) explicitly states that an orphan drug designation cannot be revoked for
reasons concerning post-approval patient population. Clearly, the FDA wanted to stay
away from restricting market exclusivity.
¶21
The concerns about orphan drug profitability have been driven mainly by five
drugs: zidovudine (treatment for HIV), pentamidine isethionate (treatment for pneumonia
associated with AIDS), human growth hormone (treatment for improper growth in
children lacking the hGH enzyme), erythropoietin (treatment for anemia associated with
end-stage renal disease), and Ceredase® (treatment for Gaucher’s disease).53 All of these
drugs were wildly profitable, yet the FDA did not fail to enforce market exclusivity for
these drugs, perhaps recognizing the fact that having a drug is better than having no drug
at all.54 Drug companies, like all private companies, are in the business of generating
profits. Since orphan drugs typically do not yield large returns on investment, they have
a hard time attracting the eyes of potential sponsors. If the FDA made it a common
practice to limit the profitability of orphan drugs, the financial incentives built into the
Act would be undercut. Orphan drugs would be even more unattractive to potential
sponsors looking for the next big revenue generator.
¶22
Moreover, since 1983 the Act has “successfully enabled the development and
marketing of more than 400 drugs and biologic products for rare diseases,”55 which
means that the five blockbuster drugs mentioned above represent less than two percent of
48

Id. at 62081.
Id.
50
Id. at 62802
51
Id. A drug can be orphaned if it (1) has a patient population less than 200,000 or (2) has no
commercial potential even though its patient population is greater than 200,000.
52
21 C.F.R. § 316.29 (2011).
53
See Pulsinelli, supra note 4, at 316–17.
54
See id. at 318.
55
Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/developingproductsforrarediseasesconditions/default.htm.
49
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all orphan drugs. In the words of the FDA, it tried “as much as possible [in implementing
the Regulations] to protect the incentives of the Orphan Drug Act without allowing their
abuse.”56
¶23
In conclusion, although the Act was not created to be a vehicle for drug companies
to generate windfall profits, the FDA has recognized the importance of financial
incentives and thus, has not tried to undercut the Act, despite the fact that the Act’s
market exclusivity provision is ripe for abuse. Rather, the FDA enacted the Regulations
with a conscious effort towards giving the financial incentives of the Act their full effect
(only protecting against false information).
III. HISTORY OF MAKENA®
“Makena is a prescription hormone medicine (progestin) used to lower the risk of
preterm birth in women who are pregnant with one baby and who have delivered another
baby too early (preterm) in the past.”57 Chemically, the active ingredient in Makena® is
17 alpha-hydroxyprogesterone caproate (“17P”).58
¶25
The FDA first approved the drug 17P in 1956, under the name Delalutin®. 59 The
approval was based on a finding of safety, but not effectiveness. 60 In 1971, the
indications for Delalutin® were reviewed for efficacy, in accordance with the new Drug
Efficacy Study Implementation program.61 In its review, the FDA stated that 17P was
“probably” effective for habitual and threatened abortion.62 However, in 1973, the FDA
reversed its prior conclusion that 17P was an effective treatment for habitual and
threatened abortion.63 In addition, the FDA gave notice that a new study had found a
possible correlation between the use of prenatal hormonal treatment and congenital heart
defects in offspring.64 As a result, all pregnancy-related indications were removed from
the labeling for Delalutin®.65
¶26
In 1977, the FDA went one step further and required all progestational drug
products (except for use in contraceptives) to be labeled with a contraindication for
pregnancy.66 The FDA’s decision was based on several reports indicating that the use of
sex hormones, including 17P, during early pregnancy could cause serious damage to
offspring.67 But in 1999, the FDA revoked its contraindication requirement for
¶24

56

Orphan Drug Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 62077.
What is Makena?, MAKENA, http://www.makena.com/pages/dtc/already-pregnant/what-ismakena.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
58
Makena® used to be called Delalutin®. See also 17 alpha-hydroxyprogesterone caproate, OBFOCUS,
http://www.obfocus.com/reference/Formulary/Drugs%20in%20Pregnancy/17OHPC.htm (last updated Oct.
18, 2007).
59
17-Hydroxyprogesterone, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/17Hydroxyprogesterone#cite_note-14 (last modified Feb. 27, 2013).
60
Determination That Delalutin Was Not Withdrawn from Sale for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness,
75 Fed. Reg. 36419 (F.D.A. June 25, 2010) (indicating the original labeling states that Delalutin “appears
to be useful” for the listed indications).
61
Id. at 36420.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
57
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progestational drug products, claiming that such labeling was not warranted based on a
review of the data.68 Less than one month later, Bristol-Myers Squibb requested a
withdrawal of its New Drug Application (NDA) for Delalutin®, claiming that the drug
had not been marketed for several years.69 On September 13, 2000, the FDA officially
withdrew its approval for Delalutin®.70
¶27
Although 17P lost FDA approval for use in pregnancy, a study conducted in 2003
by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) found that
contrary to prior studies, 17P was effective in treating preterm births, with no significant
difference in the occurrence of genital malformations in children who had been exposed
to 17P as compared to children who had been exposed to a placebo. 71 Based on this new
study, 17P for use in pregnancy made a comeback (though illegally since FDA approval
had been withdrawn), with compounding pharmacies providing generic versions of 17P
at $10 to $20 per dose.72 Since a woman was expected to take a weekly injection for
about twenty weeks, the total price of 17P was about $400.
¶28
Perhaps recognizing the re-emerging market for 17P in treating preterm birth,
CUSTOpharm, Inc. requested that the FDA determine whether approval for Delalutin®
was withdrawn for reasons of safety or effectiveness.73 If approval had been withdrawn
for either of these reasons, then according to 21 C.F.R. § 314.161,74 17P would not be
available for an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).75 Subsequently, the FDA
decided that Delalutin® had not been removed for safety and effectiveness reasons and
thus, would remain on the list of previously approved drugs and be available for an
ANDA.76
¶29
However, Adeza Biomedical Corporation was the eventual company to file an
ANDA (under the drug name Gestiva™) for 17P with the FDA.77 Recognizing the
gravity of the estimated $18 billion in costs associated with preterm births in 2003, the
FDA granted Priority Review to Adeza’s application. The agency set a goal to complete
its review or otherwise respond to the application by October 20, 2006. 78 On August 29,
68

Id.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Women who received 17P treatment had a preterm birth rate of 36.3% versus 54.9% in women who
received a placebo. 17 alpha-hydroxyprogesterone caproate, supra note 58.
72
Daniel J. DeNoon, FDA: Pharmacies Can Still Make Preterm Birth Drug, WEBMD (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.webmd.com/baby/news/20110330/fda-generic-makena-ok.
73
Determination That Delalutin Was Not Withdrawn From Sale for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness,
75 Fed. Reg. at 36420.
74
According to § 314.161, the FDA will remove a “drug that the agency determines is withdrawn for
safety or effectiveness reasons” from the list of previously approved drugs that are candidates for an
Abbreviated New Drug Application. 21 C.F.R. § 314.161 (2003).
75
Id. An Abbreviated New Drug Application does not require preclinical and clinical trial data to
establish safety and effectiveness. See also, Abbreviated New Drug Application, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abbreviated_New_Drug_Application (last modified Nov. 16, 2012).
76
Determination That Delalutin Was Not Withdrawn From Sale for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness,
75 Fed. Reg. at 36421 (indicating Delalutin would remain on the “Discontinued Drug Product List” section
of the Orange Book).
77
Adeza Submits New Drug Application For Gestiva to Prevent Preterm Births, DRUGS.COM (May 4,
2006), http://www.drugs.com/nda/gestiva_060504.html. Adeza also filed an application for Orphan Drug
designation. Id.
78
FDA Grants Adeza Priority Review for Gestiva to Prevent Preterm Births, DRUGS.COM (June 5,
2006), http://www.drugs.com/nda/gestiva_060605.html. Priority Review “is given to drugs that offer
69
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2006, the FDA Advisory Committee determined that the NICHD data submitted as part
of the Gestiva™ application provided sufficient evidence of efficacy and safety to
support the approval of Gestiva™ for use in women with a history of preterm delivery.79
Consistent with the Committee’s recommendation, the FDA determined on October 23,
2006 that Gestiva™ would be approved. However, the approval was contingent upon an
additional animal study and a few other requirements.80 On January 31, 2007, Gestiva™
was granted Orphan Drug designation, effectively giving Adeza seven years of market
exclusivity so long as the FDA approved the drug.81
¶30
After a series of business transactions by which Hologic Inc. ended up with the
rights to Gestiva™, KV announced on January 22, 2008 that it had agreed to purchase the
rights to Gestiva™ contingent upon FDA approval.82 The purchase price was $82
million, with $7.5 million paid up front and the balance due upon FDA approval. 83
However, on January 26, 2009, KV announced that the FDA was not satisfied with the
additional data that had been submitted pursuant to the FDA’s Approvable Letter on
October 23, 2006.84 As in 2006, the FDA wanted additional data regarding the efficacy
and safety of Gestiva™.85 Furthermore, the FDA tightened its post-approval trial
requirement such that a portion of the study subjects had to be enrolled in the study prior
to approval.86
¶31
Finally, on February 4, 2011, the FDA approved Makena® (formerly known as
Gestiva™) under the FDA’s accelerated approval process.87 Under accelerated approval,
the FDA can approve a drug that fills an unmet medical need by determining whether
there is a surrogate endpoint benefit that represents a clinically meaningful outcome.88 In
this case, the fulfillment of an unmet need was reducing the risk of delivery before thirtyseven weeks of pregnancy. However, the sponsor of the drug must conduct postapproval trials to demonstrate that the drug in fact does have a clinical benefit, such as
improving the outcome of babies born to women treated with Makena®.89 Currently, KV
major advances in treatment, or provide a treatment where no adequate therapy exists.” Fast Track,
Accelerated Approval and Priority Review, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forpatientadvocates/speedingaccesstoimportantnewtherapies/
ucm128291.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2012).
79
FDA Advisory Committee Recommends Approval of Adeza’s NDA for Gestiva to Prevent Preterm
Birth, DRUGS.COM (Aug. 29, 2006), http://www.drugs.com/nda/gestiva_060829.html.
80
Id.
81
Adeza Receives Orphan Drug Designation for Gestiva, BUSINESSWIRE (Jan. 31, 2007),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20070131005402/en/Adeza-Receives-Orphan-DrugDesignation-Gestiva.
82
On April 2, 2007, Adeza was acquired by Cytyc Corp., which then merged with Hologic, Inc. on
October 22, 2007. Hologic Announces Sale of Gestiva, DRUGS.COM (Jan. 22, 2008),
http://www.drugs.com/nda/gestiva_080122.html.
83
Id. The purchase price was revised upwards to about $200 million. KV Pharma, Hologic change
terms of Gestiva sale, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 11, 2010),
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2010765041_apuskvpharmagestiva.html.
84
KV Pharmaceutical's Launch of Gestiva Delayed, DRUGS.COM (Jan. 26, 2009),
http://www.drugs.com/nda/gestiva_090126.html.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
FDA Approves Makena, DRUGS.COM (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.drugs.com/newdrugs/fda-approvesmakena-reduce-risk-preterm-birth-risk-pregnant-women-2518.html.
88
Id.; 21 C.F.R. § 314.510.
89
The improvements include reducing infant mortality and health problems associated with preterm
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is conducting an international trial to confirm the safety and effectiveness of Makena®
and will conduct another post-approval infant study that will be completed by 2018.90
¶32
Two observations can be drawn from the long history behind Makena®’s approval.
First, although the FDA recognized early on that preterm birth was serious enough to
accelerate the approval process, the FDA was not completely convinced by the NICHD
study. If the FDA had been convinced, then it seems unlikely that the FDA would have
delayed approval on two separate occasions, both calling for additional data regarding
the safety and effectiveness of Makena®. Thus, contrary to public opinion, Makena® is
still an unproven drug, which would suggest that it is exactly the type of drug that needs
to come under the purview of the FDA.
¶33
Second, even though KV relied on the NICHD study, a taxpayer-funded study, as
the basis for its New Drug Application for Makena® (technically, it was a New Drug
Application for Gestiva™), KV has had to spend and will continue to spend millions of
dollars to comply with the FDA approval process.91 Thus, contrary to the public outcry
that KV is free-riding off the taxpayer dollar, KV is actually spending a lot of money to
convince the FDA that Makena® is a safe and effective drug. Moreover, it is easy to
forget that by relying on the NICHD study, KV passed on many of the Act’s financial
incentives that would otherwise have been paid for by taxpayers had KV conducted its
own initial studies. In this case, taxpayers saved on having to help KV develop the initial
clinical studies. In addition, taxpayers will benefit from the increased tax revenue that
otherwise would have been discounted by the fifty percent tax provision of the Act.
IV. TO APPROVE OR NOT TO APPROVE?
¶34

According to FDA deputy director Sandra Kweder, the NICHD study showed
“higher rates of miscarriages and stillbirths in women taking [Makena®] vs. those taking
a placebo, as well as higher rates of pre-eclampsia, deficiencies of amniotic fluid, and
gestational diabetes.”92 In 2006, the FDA’s Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory
Committee unanimously recommended further studies to investigate the correlation
between 17P and second trimester miscarriage and stillbirth.93 The same panel split
thirteen to eight in favor of recommending approval prior to those studies, but even those
in favor voiced concerns over the drug’s safety and effectiveness. 94 However, for those
in favor of an accelerated approval, the potential benefits of treating a “huge and

delivery Id. Failure to find clinical benefit will result in a withdrawal of FDA approval.
90
Id.
91
Ther-Rx Corporation Takes Action to Further Ensure High-Risk Women Are Able to Access FDAApproved Makena™, KV PHARMACEUTICAL,
http://www.kvph.com/news_center_article.aspx?articleid=341 (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (claiming that
ongoing and scheduled studies are four times larger and twelve times more expensive than the NICHD
study).
92
FDA's fast-track approval of Makena could backfire on KV, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 13,
2011, 12:25 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/article_e4472916-0646-539d-b04a520756765418.html.
93
The recommendation was unanimous, twenty-one to zero. Id.
94
Id. (“‘I’m still skeptical,’ [said] Dr. Jim Scott, professor and former chair of the Obstetrics and
Gynecology department at the University of Utah . . . .”).

551

NOR THWESTERN JOUR NAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

[2013

devastating” problem such as preterm birth outweighed the risks associated with
approval.95
¶35
The difficulty and reservation (split 13-8) with which the Reproductive Health
Drugs Advisory Committee recommended approving Makena indicates that although the
effects of a drug may not fully be understood, the medical community is willing, at times,
to risk dire consequences, such as stillbirth. At first glance, this seems contrary to the
modus operandi of the FDA: “to prevent harm to the American people.”96 But as with
almost everything in life, decisions must be made by balancing the risks and rewards of
the situation. The key to containing any potential fallout from a decision is to make sure
that (1) someone is accountable for the outcomes and (2) as many variables are under
direct control as possible. By approving Makena®, the FDA was essentially doing that:
(1) bringing the marketing of 17P under its direct purview and (2) making sure that
studies on the safety and effectiveness of 17P would be satisfactorily completed.
V. POST APPROVAL
After receiving FDA approval for Makena®, KV sent “cease and desist” letters to
the various pharmacies that were compounding 17P.97 Additionally, KV announced that
it would be charging $1,500 per shot of Makena®,98 which sparked an immediate public
outcry since pharmacies had been compounding 17P for $10 to $20 per shot over the past
few years. On March 30, 2011, the FDA responded to the situation by informing the
public that it did not intend to regulate pharmacies that compound 17P from “a valid
prescription for an individually identified patient,” unless the compounded drugs were
“unsafe, of substandard quality, or [were] not being compounded in accordance with
appropriate standards for compounding sterile products.”99 Soon after, KV reduced the
price of Makena® to $690 per dose.100
¶37
On June 15, 2012, the FDA issued a nominal reversal of its prior statement that it
would not regulate compounding agencies for 17P.101 However, the FDA made clear that
it would still take into consideration particular patient circumstances to determine
whether to regulate the compounding of 17P.102 Furthermore, the FDA stated that
enforcement action for compounded drugs is prioritized using a risk-based approach.103
¶38
Although the FDA has recognized that compounded 17P may not pass the rigorous
chemical standards required by the Makena® NDA,104 the FDA’s prior stance on the
¶36
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Id.
FDA News Release, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 6, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm176119.htm.
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DeNoon, supra note 72.
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Id.
99
FDA Statement, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.fda.gov/newsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm249025.htm.
100
Andrew Zajac, Drug Maker Lowers Price of Makena Pregnancy Drug to $690 Per Dose, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/01/news/la-pn-makena-price-cut-fda-20110401.
101
FDA and CMS Issue Important Updates on Makena®, KV PHARMACEUTICAL,
http://www.kvph.com/news_center_article.aspx?articleid=359 (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
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Updated FDA Statement, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (June 15, 2012),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm308546.htm.
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regulation of 17P suggests that the FDA may not prioritize the regulation of 17P for two
reasons. Firstly, the large price hike makes the drug unaffordable to many patients and
thus, gives the FDA a reason to allow the compounding of 17P. Secondly, since 17P has
been compounded for several years now, the FDA likely does not see the compounding
of 17P as a high-risk situation, despite the long approval history of Makena®. Thus,
although the FDA has issued an official reversal of its stance on the regulation of 17P, it
does not appear to be a compelling reversal. For that reason, I will assume that the
reversal is merely nominal and that the FDA’s decision to exercise enforcement
discretion is still in effect.
VI. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE ANALYSIS
¶39

Although the compounding of drugs is illegal under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (the FDCA), the FDA has historically declined to regulate compounded
drugs, leaving primary regulatory responsibility to the states. 105 Since the FDA has not
implemented regulations that call for the enforcement of compounded drugs in general,
KV would not have a strong argument claiming the illegality under the FDCA of the
FDA’s decision to exercise enforcement discretion.
¶40
A significantly different, but better, approach can be found in the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. The Takings Clause states that the government cannot take private
property for public use without just compensation.106 Since the FDA did not provide any
sort of compensation to KV, the elements of “public use” and “just compensation” do not
need be analyzed. Rather, the only element that matters is whether the decision to
exercise enforcement discretion constituted a “taking”.
¶41
A “taking” can occur in two ways: (1) it can occur through the physical taking of
property or (2) it can occur through a government regulation that effectively amounts to a
physical taking, but without actually divesting the rights to the property. The FDA’s
decision to exercise enforcement discretion does not initially appear to fall into either one
of these categories. Yet, under further consideration, it seems that the FDA’s actions
could actually fall under both of these categories.
A. Physical Taking
¶42

Physical taking is most commonly thought of in the context of real property (i.e.
land). However, the Supreme Court has held that the Takings Clause can also be applied
to private property other than real property. For example, in Phillips v. Washington
Legal Foundation, the Court had to address the issue of whether interest income
generated from client funds held by an attorney in connection with his practice of law
qualified as private property for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.107 Prior to 1980,
federally insured banks were prohibited from paying interest on demand deposits. 108 But
after Congress authorized interest payments in specific instances, forty-eight states
105

Boodoo, supra note 14, at 231 (“Recognizing the considerable public health benefits and long history
of compounding . . . the FDA historically afforded compounding pharmacists an unspoken exemption from
the FDCA.”).
106
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
107
Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 160 (1998).
108
Id.
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adopted an Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (“IOLTA”) program. The program
mandated that certain client funds had to be deposited into an IOLTA account, with the
interest income generated from that account to be paid to foundations that financed legal
services for low-income individuals.109 The legislation was challenged as a taking and
the Court subsequently held that the interest income qualified as private property for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.110
¶43
A key characteristic of interest income is that it is derived from the principal funds
held in a bank account and thus, does not have any value or existence apart from that
principal. Yet the Court was willing to expand the concept of private property to include
derivatives. Similarly, the value of seven years of market exclusivity under the Act is
derived from an orphan drug. Without the rights to market an orphan drug, market
exclusivity is meaningless. But since the Court extended the concept of private property
to include derivatives, the rights to market exclusivity under the Act should also be
treated as property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. In fact, in a speech before the
House of Representatives regarding proposed amendments to the Act, Representative
James H. Scheuer expressed the idea that the right to market exclusivity was a property
right subject to Fifth Amendment protection.111
¶44
If we assume that the right to market exclusivity is protected by the Fifth
Amendment, the FDA’s decision to exercise enforcement discretion, effectively usurping
that right, can be construed as a direct taking of KV’s private property. Of course, the
FDA did not physically take anything from KV, but by refusing to regulate compounding
pharmacies, which happens to be the only source of competition for Makena®, the FDA
effectively took away the right to market exclusivity.
¶45
A counterargument to this analysis is that the Act guarantees only that the FDA
will abstain from approving a generic drug for the same indication for seven years. 112 So
technically speaking, the FDA has not violated that rule. However, we should not forget
that compounded drugs are still illegal under the FDCA. So if the FDA were to abide by
the letter of the law, then it would have to regulate the generic versions of Makena®.
B. Regulatory Taking
¶46

As discussed in the section above, the right to market exclusivity can be seen as
private property for the purposes of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. With that
assumption in place, the FDA’s decision to exercise enforcement discretion can also be
seen as a form of regulation that effectively amounts to a taking. As a regulatory body,
anything that the FDA does can be construed as a regulation, since any action is
essentially an implementation of the laws.
¶47
Under the regulatory takings framework, there are two main approaches by which
to analyze the situation. The first one is the ad hoc test from Penn Central
Transportation v. New York, which is essentially a balancing test. The second approach
is to determine whether the regulation is a per se taking by virtue of depriving the owner
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Id. at 172.
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of all economic use of the property.113 It is difficult to argue that KV has been stripped of
all economic use of Makena®, since KV can still sell Makena® in the marketplace.
Thus, the most applicable lens by which to analyze the situation is through the Penn
Central ad hoc test.
¶48
The Penn Central test looks at three elements: (1) the character of the government
action, (2) the protection of reasonable, investment-backed expectations, and (3) the
economic impact of the regulation on the owner.114 In analyzing the character of the
government action, the Court looked to whether the action was taken to protect the public
interest115 and whether the action was discriminatory in nature.116 In Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, the Court found that the restriction on coal mining was in the
public interest because the regulation was designed to prevent erosion, which would have
caused significant harm to the integrity of the plumbing and structure of neighboring
homes.117 A similar argument could be made that the FDA’s decision to exercise
enforcement discretion was in the public interest because it was designed to ensure
affordable access to 17P. However, in Keystone the Court held that the regulation was
not a taking because the protection of the public interest outweighed the economic impact
to Keystone.118 More specifically, the Court characterized the economic impact as
affecting only two percent of the available coal. 119 However, in our case the economic
impact to KV is arguably much more, since doctors do not have an incentive to prescribe
Makena® at $690 per dose when they can prescribe the exact same drug at $10 to $20 per
dose. Hypothetically then, the FDA’s action potentially usurps 100 percent of the value
of Makena®.
¶49
In Penn Central, the Court also did not find a taking, holding that on the issue of
“character,” the regulation on construction was not discriminatory because the regulation
affected all historical landmarks and not just Penn Central.120 However, in our case the
FDA’s past decisions to enforce the market exclusivity of other highly profitable drugs,
such as hGH, make the FDA’s decision regarding Makena® appear highly discriminatory
against KV.
¶50
Secondly, it is clear that KV paid $200 million for the rights to Makena® 121 under
the reasonable expectation that the FDA would enforce market exclusivity. KV was
reasonable in its expectation because Congress, the FDA, and even the President all
expressed their belief that market exclusivity was a necessary incentive for attracting
orphan drug sponsors. Moreover, the FDA’s track record regarding highly profitable
113

See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that a regulation barring a land
owner from building homes on his beachfront property rendered the property valueless and, thus, the
regulation was a per se taking).
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orphan drugs was an additional signal that KV would be able to enjoy exclusive
marketing of Makena® for seven years.
¶51
Thirdly, the FDA’s decision has had a significant economic impact on KV’s ability
to survive. KV purchased Makena® as a way to generate cash flow in order to stave off
bankruptcy after the FDA shutdown KV’s pharmaceutical manufacturing line. If KV did
not think that Makena® could generate sufficient cash flow, KV would not have made
the purchase. However, in August 2012, KV entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy and cited
the FDA’s decision to exercise enforcement discretion as a key reason.122 To make
matters worse, KV has already agreed to conduct post-approval trials on Makena® and
thus, faces the real risk of sinking hundreds of millions of dollars into an investment that
will have a negative return. That is not a good position to be in for a company that is in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
¶52
In conclusion, the Takings Clause can provide a framework by which KV can
argue that the FDA has unlawfully exercised its enforcement discretion.
VII.

CONCLUSION

¶53

The Orphan Drug Act can arguably be deemed a success, if one looks at the
number of new drugs that have come on the market for rare diseases compared to the
number of drugs that were already on the market for rare diseases prior to the passing of
the Act. As we have seen, a large contributing factor to this success was the
Amendments to the Act that increased the legal certainty surrounding orphan status.
Although this certainty may have come at the cost of being overly inclusive (of drugs that
should not be labeled “orphans” because the financial incentive is already there), the
history of orphan drugs shows that less than two percent of these orphans have yielded
overly large profits. This suggests that the fear of exploitation may not be substantiated.
Moreover, the very small probability of very high returns can provide a further incentive,
beyond market exclusivity, for firms to make an investment in orphan drugs. Since drug
development is a private endeavor and requires reasonable returns on investment, this
kind of incentive is arguably good for society.
¶54
Furthermore, all the past signals from Congress, the FDA, and former President
George W. Bush, indicate an awareness of the need to provide financial incentives with a
willingness to allow some firms to excessively profit from orphan drugs. Subsequently,
these signals have set the stage by which firms may come to rely on the fact that the
government has tolerated or perhaps even encouraged firms to try to make excessive
profits from orphan drugs. The ability to make a large profit from an orphan drug is
precisely what motivated KV to purchase Makena®. But as we discussed, KV’s reliance
on the FDA’s past actions, coupled with the large economic impact that the FDA’s
decision has had on KV’s finances, suggest that the government unlawfully took KV’s
right to market exclusivity of Makena®.
¶55
The risk of exploitation at the cost to consumers is palpable. In fact, it is clear that
the original $1,500 price tag of Makena® would have put the drug out of reach for some
qualified individuals, either because one’s insurance would not reimburse for the drug or
122
K-V Pharmaceutical Company Files Voluntary Petitions for Reorganization to Restructure Financial
Obligations, KV PHARMACEUTICAL, http://www.kvph.com/news_center_article.aspx?articleid=364 (last
visited Apr. 8, 2011).
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because one’s deductibles would be too high. But usurping the rights to market
exclusivity in the face of precedent is not a legitimate way for the government to limit
exploitation. If the FDA is concerned about the exploitation of the Act, then it should
write up a report to Congress, imploring them to pass amendments that would limit the
rights to market exclusivity. But if past Congressional history can provide any guidance,
we should not expect significant change to the Orphan Drug Act. At the same time, it is
not in the power of the FDA to enact legislative change. Instead, the FDA should honor
its decision to award orphan status to Makena® until the laws dictate otherwise.
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